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Abstract
Forecasting political behavior using economic indicators is not a very new phenomenon with
the earliest literature going back as far as the 1930s. In the present day, there exists a lot of
research on the topic, but the majority of these studies have been conducted in the context
of a very limited number of countries such as the United States or the Western European
ones. By comparison, the research on forecasting the political behavior using economic
voting in Estonia is almost non-existent. This thesis will be the first in-depth study conducted
at that level and forecasts the party support of the Estonian Reform Party and the Estonian
Center Party using economic indicators as the predictor variables. Based on the previous
economic voting theory, it has been argued that the theoretically correct model to forecast
using these variables is the linear regression due to the expected associations between the
economic variables and party support. However, this thesis contests this claim and argues
that when analyzing the phenomena of forecasting party support using economic indicators,
certain modern machine learning algorithms could be considered as legitimate alternatives to
the linear regression, as each of them addresses the different shortcomings of the model. For
this reason, this thesis compares the methods of linear regression, regularized linear models,
autoregressive integrated moving average, and the decision-tree models to see whether the
more modern approaches are able to improve upon the default linear regression model.
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1 Introduction
There are numerous different theories of how people vote, one of the most popular of them
being the concept of economic voting. The basic premise of economic voting lies in the
idea that the electorate continuously evaluates the performance of their governments and
holds them accountable for economic outcomes, rewarding the incumbent party when the
economy is moving in an upwards trend and punishing them when the economic indicators
are declining. The practice of forecasting elections using macroeconomic indicators is very
widespread in the Western countries, especially the United States and in the field of political
science as a whole, but at the same time, the more serious country-level research in Estonia
is scarce. This thesis will be the first in-depth study conducted at Estonian level that analyses
the concept of forecasting party support of the Estonian Reform Party and the Estonian Center
Party using time-series aggregated economic indicators and voting data. The reasoning for
choosing these two particular parties is two-fold. Firstly, the Reform Party has been the
incumbent party of the Estonian government for the whole duration of the data used in the
analysis and, on the contrary, the Center Party has been the non-incumbent the whole time.
For this reason, it is possible to automatically view these parties in their respective roles when
it comes to interpreting the economic effects on their support. The second reasoning is that
these two parties have been the most stable ones throughout the last decade and the party
support data sample is the largest. Even though this thesis analyzes only these two parties, its
broader goal is to find a more universally applicable model that could also be used to forecast
the support of other parties in the system.
The second side of the research question deals with the comparison of machine learning
regression algorithms. In past, the research has generally viewed a mechanism-based linear
regression model as the "theoretically correct" method. However, this thesis contests this
argument on the grounds of linear regression having multiple shortfalls that might make it a
sub-optimal choice to model party support using macroeconomic variables. For this reason,
in addition to the linear regression, this model also models the party support using regularized
linear models which are able to perform variable selection, autoregressive integrated moving
average model which takes into consideration the time-series specifics of the data, and also
the decision-tree models which offer a non-parametric approach with the simple objective of
maximizing the prediction accuracy at the cost of model interpretability. The results of all the
different models will be compared to the linear regression see whether any of them is able to
provide a significant improvement.
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The general structure of the main body of the thesis is as follows: theoretical background,
research design, results, and discussion. More specifically, the theoretical background section
of the work first gives the historical background of the concept of economic voting, theoretical
foundations of the economic voting indicators, and also outlines some of the challenges that
the economic voting theory suffers from. The theory chapter also gives an overview of how
to actually forecast party support using economic indicators and different machine learning
methods, meaning that what are the theoretical relationships between different economic
variables and party support and additionally, how exactly do all of the machine learning
algorithms used in this work differ from one another and how each of them could be expected
to improve upon the linear regression model. The third part of the theoretical background
chapter gives a theoretical understanding of how these different machine learning methods
work, starting with linear regression and moving onto models that build upon it. Theoretical
understanding of different methods is necessary to really grasp the differences between each
model and what makes them unique from one another. The research design part of the thesis
will firstly outline the sources of the data that is used in the analysis, provides the exploratory
data analysis of both the party support over time and the economic indicators used in the
analysis, and also how the model accuracy is assessed. The last part of the research design
is dedicated to optimizing parameters of different machine learning models. Almost all of
them have parameters that must be estimated and it is non-trivial in order to achieve the
optimal performance for each model. The results part of the thesis offers the results and brief
comments on the different models for both parties. Lastly, the discussion part of the thesis
takes a more general approach and interprets the results in a wider context, outlining what
was expected and unexpected and providing explanations for the latter.
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2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Theory of Economic Voting
2.1.1 Historical Background of Economic Voting
The concept of ’economic voting’ is mainly grounded in the ideas of issue and reasoning
voting by focusing only on the issue of the economy (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2013). From
the theoretical view, it means that electorate evaluates the performance of governments and
holds them accountable for economic outcomes by either rewarding or punishing accordingly.
The action of holding government accountable is achieved through prospective voting when
the performance is perceived as favorable and by not voting when an alternative offers better
expectation. For this reason, support of incumbent increases when the economy is improving
and decreases when economic conditions in a society worsen.
Even though there are works exploring the relationship between economic and electoral
performance going back as far as the 1930s (Tibbits 1931), it was not until second half of
the 20th century that the field became a major focus in the field of political science. While
some theoretical foundations of economic voting could be viewed to come from classical
voting behavior, it is mainly based on the rational choice theory. The rational choice model
essentially views electorate as strategic utility maximizers who make their decisions related
to electoral action based on what they stand to gain or lose and always choosing the option
that is expected to benefit them the most and at the same time cost them the least (Evans
2004). The shift from viewing economic voting through classical voting theories to rational
choice theory did not happen overnight and many of the earlier works on the topic intertwined
the two approaches. This can be seen in works such as Anthony Downs’s 1957 article
which was one of the first articles to approached the process of prospective voting from
the perspective of rational choice. Downs’s work postulated that when making informed
political decisions, the electorate does not only use the past performance but also use this
past behavior to make predictions about future and subsequently make decisions based on
the expected outcome (Downs 1957). Similarly, Campbell et al. empirically demonstrated in
their work how voter attitudes and different evaluations, including the economic assessment,
are a part of the electorate’s decision making (Campbell et al. 1960). Valdimer Key took this
idea of voters evaluating the performance of political parties and expanded the argument to
retrospective voting or reward-punishment theory. He contended that electorate also evaluates
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past performance of government and rewards them on the basis of what they deliver or
punishes for falling short of the promises (Key 1966). The aforementioned works could be
viewed as a mixture of classical approaches and the rational choice theory, laying important
groundwork for further developments in the field of studying economic voting.
Economic voting as a field of research attracted attention in the 1970s which saw a number
of path-breaking works on the topic. These include articles such as Kramer’s which analyzed
aggregate-level economic voting in the United States congressional elections and showed
that incumbent party support is related to the national economic performance; namely that
improvements in macroeconomic indicators such as average income resulted in increased
lower chamber of the Congress vote share for the incumbent president’s party and against it
when macroeconomic indicators moved the other way (Kramer 1971). Other similar works
published around that time, which used aggregate-level data, arrived at similar conclusions.
This could be exemplified by Edward Tufte’s 1978 article which showed similar to Kramer’s
conclusions that greater the growth in real disposable income, the better the president’s
party expected to perform in the upcoming elections and further solidifying the link between
economic indicators and electoral support (Tufte 1978). Around the same time Morris Fiorina
was one of the first to shift the analysis from macro-level to individual level. Drawing
inspiration from Key’s 1966 article, Fiorina established the theory of retrospective economic
voting, arguing that economy is the primary issue that voters evaluate in national elections and
do so by evaluating the government’s past economic performance (Fiorina 1981). However,
at the same time Fiorina also recognized that electorate could act prospectively as proposed
by Downs in 1957. To this day there is no clear answer of whether economic voting should be
viewed as a retrospective or prospective process, although the dominant belief is that voters
mainly make their decisions based on the past economic performance rather than trying to
predict the future (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2013). It is also worth mentioning Roderick
Kiewlet’s 1983 study which added additional important dimension to the theory of economic
voting. His work showed that the economic voting could be sociotropic, that is based on
the state of the national economy or pocketbook, which could be viewed as an evaluation of
personal financial circumstances. Kiewlet’s analysis found strong conclusions that economic
evaluations dominate personal finances in voters’ electoral decision-making and additionally
that economic voting is generally incumbency-oriented (Kiewlet 1983). Basically all of the
aforementioned early work on economic voting was the United States-centric and it was not
until 1988 when Michael Lewis-Beck published his study which took the same concepts and
applied them to national surveys in Western Europe. His work concluded that similar to the
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United States, both retrospective and prospective economic voting is evident in European
nations and furthermore, it is also primarily sociotropic (Lewis-Beck 1988). Ever since then,
the field of research is not any more the United States-centric and there is a vast corpus
of articles and book on the subject available. However, at the same time, most of that
research has been carried out in the Western Europe, focusing on countries such as the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy (Lewis-Beck 1986) and to a lesser degree countries
such as the Netherlands (van der Eijk & Niemöller 1987) and Denmark (Nannestad & Paldam
1997). In many other instances, such as Estonia, the country-level research on the topic of
economic voting is at best scarce or sometimes non-existent. Even though there does exist
some rudimentary research in the Estonian case (Solvak 2015), this thesis will be the first
in-depth study at Estonian level that explores forecasting party support using the economic
voting indicators as independent variables.
2.1.2 Theoretical Background of Economic Voting Indicators
Most of the early work in the field of economic voting was done examining popularity
functions which proposed that government’s popularity is determined by macroeconomic
conditions and political controls (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2013). Because of the limitations
in data availability, most of the early research on the subject of economic voting was done
using aggregated time-series data. In the early studies of popularity functions, national-level
macroeconomic indicators took the role of independent variables and were analyzed to see
how these relate to government support or electoral outcomes (Goodhart & Bhansali 1970;
Mueller 1973). Goodhart and Bhansali’s article showed the relationship between government
popularity and macroeconomic conditions such as unemployment and inflation rate. The
article found that when the economy performs well, the electorate favors incumbent and
when economy moves in a downward trend, the incumbent support suffers (Goodhart &
Bhansali 1970), also known as the responsibility hypothesis (Nannestad & Paldam 1994).
Mueller’s 1973 work arrived at the similar conclusions with the addition that the impact
of the economy is asymmetrical, meaning that the electorate is more likely to punish the
incumbents for economic decline than reward them following prosperity (Mueller 1973). In
addition to the aforementioned economic indicators influencing the support, the later studies
such as Gary Jacobson’s 1990 article found that change gross domestic product is also a
significant factor (Jacobson 1990). Subsequent studies have also involved variables such as
nonfarm payrolls, consumption expenditures, and stock market performance among others
10
(Silver 2012), but the links between these indicators are generally weaker than the ’big three’
and more often than not localized to only certain cases. Similarly, because of their proven
universal applicability, unemployment, inflation, and changes in the gross domestic product
are the only economic variables used in this present thesis. In addition, studies have found
that electorate tends to have a short time horizon when evaluating economic performance
and the effects decay fast (Nannestad & Paldam 1994), so it is necessary to include as short
lag structure as possible. Seeing as the aggregate macroeconomic data is generally collected
monthly or quarterly, the most reasonable course of action would be to use the lag value
of t − 1 as it minimizes the decay that occurs. While it is not an economic indicator, the
models generally also include some kind of seasonality or temporal dimension. Previous
studies have argued that retrospective and prospective decision-making do not stay constant
throughout time, but rather are influenced by the election cycle (Singer & Carlin 2013). The
findings show that if an election cycle starts right after the election and ends right before the
next one, at the start of the cycle the support based on economic voting is mainly based
on prospective decision-making. This is so because there is a ’honeymoon’ period and
the electorate does not yet have sufficient information to evaluate the government’s actions
after the election. However, after the new incumbent’s record mounts, the electorate starts
to approach the decision-making from more retrospectively based on the events that have
happened since the election, but as shown by previous theory, even though retrospective
voting rises, prospective still reigns supreme with electorate comparing the incumbent’s
performance to the expectations for the future. At the end of a cycle, the electorate’s focus
shifts again to prospective voting as they do not think about what has happened in the past,
but rather base their decisions on the expectations related to future. The previous research
conducted on Estonian level has also shown that there exists a statistically significant link
between the electoral cycle and party support (Solvak 2015).
Inflation signifies an increase of goods and services in an economy over time, meaning that
when price level rises, each unit of currency can buy less. Inflation is generally measured
using inflation rate which is the annualized percentage change in a general price index such
as the consumer price index. The opposite of inflation is deflation, meaning a decrease in the
price of goods and services and occurs when the inflation rate falls below 0 %. The best case
scenario for the incumbent party is a situation with moderately low inflation because some
inflation in an economy is a sign of health. However, on the contrary, too large or negative
rate could be interpreted as a negative aspect and therefore it makes sense for the electorate to
punish the incumbent party. Economic growth could be viewed as the inflation-adjusted value
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of goods and services and is measured as the percent rate of increase in real gross domestic
product. The relationship between change in gross domestic product and party support could
be argued to be linear, meaning that when economic growth is larger, the economy prospers
and the support for incumbent party increases. However, when the change in gross domestic
product is low or negative, it can be assumed that electorate support for the incumbent party
will decrease and voters will start looking for other options in the form of non-incumbent
parties. Lastly, unemployment shows the percentage of unemployed workers in the total
labor force. Moderately low unemployment is common in societies and a small change in
the environment where unemployment is already low could be argued to have a small effect.
However, when unemployment increases over some critical limit, the effect it has on the
party support changes more radically than with lower unemployment. For that reason, it
could be said that the relationship between unemployment and party support is non-linear
and asymmetrical.
2.1.3 The Challenges of Economic Voting Theory
Even though the economic voting research published since the 1970s shows a clear link
between economic indicators and political support, the field also faces some considerable
challenges. One of the main concerns the economic voting theory faces is that the economic
effects tend to be conditional and not universal (Anson & Hellwig 2015). For example,
most of the research done on the subject has been bounded to political systems such as the
United States, the United Kingdom, or France and even though there does exist theoretical
overlap, there are also differences among cases which must be considered when conducting
an analysis. For this reason, there does not exist a universal theory of economic voting, but
rather each country or case should be viewed in a vacuum. More so, the differences in results
do not only become prevalent between different countries, but the research has shown that
the lack of stability, also known as ’instability dilemma’ (Paldam 1991) caused by imprecise
modeling, can also happen in a single country over time (Lewis-Beck & Paldam 2000). The
authors have suggested that in order to sufficiently account for potential instability in different
countries, institutional conditions such as the party system type must be considered in the
model (Lewis-Beck & Paldam 2000), but so far, the relevant evidence remains thin. Other
authors have argued that the instability can also be caused by of how the dependent variable
is operationalized in different studies. Van der Brug et al. believed that in different party
system types such as single-party or multi-party systems, the electorate’s decision-making
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process differs because the competition between parties and their alternatives is also different
(van der Brug et al. 2007). There is no clear consensus on what is the actual root of this lack
of stability among countries and sometimes in a single country over time, but the aspect that
the theory is not universal and each case should be viewed separately is something that must
be kept in mind when researching economic voting.
Economic voting also makes the assumption of homogeneity; that the electorate responds to
economic stimulus uniformly (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2013). However, in reality, that is
not the case and certain groups of the population have their vote probability affected more
than others. For example, previous research has found that women may have the different
response than men to the economic changes (Welch & Hibbing 1992). Similarly, Duch et
al. found that voters with differing levels of voter experience and information exposure can
also vary in their response because of being able to assess the quality of economy differently
(Duch et al. 2000) and also that the level of political trust can alter perception about national
economic conditions (Duch 2001). These studies show that there is some heterogeneity in the
economic voting, but it is not clear to what extent. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier suggest that
while heterogeneity exists, with properly controlling for the relevant variables in a correctly
specified model of the vote, it is still possible to make meaningful generalizations about the
economic effects, meaning that while heterogeneity introduces some noise to the analysis,
the main signal still comes from the homogeneous effect (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2013).
Finally, the economic voting also has the concern of endogeneity of economic evaluations.
The economy, as shown by a number of studies published on the subject, has a statistically
significant effect on the election result (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2013). However, this
perspective has received opposition from a perspective which argues that these economic
effects are exaggerated, mainly due to the endogeneity problem. Authors such as Kramer
have proposed that the effects are inflated because the economic evaluations of voters can be
shaped by their pre-existing political preferences (Kramer 1983). For example, the part of
the electorate that already supports the incumbent government might view economic effects
more positively, while the voters who support non-incumbent parties might be more negative
in their evaluation of the same effects towards the incumbent party. For that reason, the
differences in responses might not be linked to changes in economic conditions, but rather
the subjective judgment of economic conditions (van der Brug et al. 2007). Some authors
have claimed that the economic effects in the previous studies have been overstated (Wlezien
et al. 1997; Evans & Andersen 2006; Anderson 2007) while the proponents of economic
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voting have addressed this critique by employing a method of variable exogenisation and
have found persistent effects of sociotropic retrospective evaluation on the vote (Lewis-Beck
et al. 2008; Fraile & Lewis-Beck 2014).
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2.2 Forecasting Party Support Using Economic Indicators
Before modeling the party support using economic indicators, it is necessary to explore the
expected relationships between the variables or how exactly is the economy supposed to
influence the support. The expected relationships between the indicators and the support for
incumbent/non-incumbent party are pictured below in figure 1.
Figure 1. The theoretically expected relationships between economic indicators and both
incumbent/non-incumbent parties. Upper left: gross domestic product, upper right: inflation,
lower left: unemployment.
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As the figure shows, the relationship between change in gross domestic product and party
support can be expected to be linear. It means that if the change in gross domestic product is
positive, the support rating for incumbent party is also expected to go up at the approximately
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constant rate and on the contrary, if the change in the economic indicator is negative, the
incumbent party support is expected to similarly decrease. For the inflation indicator, the
relationship between the variable and party support is expected to be parabola-shaped. It
means that for the incumbent party, the support is expected to be at its highest in cases
where the inflation is around zero and decreases as inflation approaches either end. The
reason for such relationship is that near-zero inflation is the ideal case scenario as some
inflation in an economy is to be expected, but it is not supposed to be too high or too
low. Very high or negative inflation in an economy is perceived as a problem, so it is
logical that the electorate would view such inflation values as the fault of the incumbent
party, which in turn leads to lower support. As for the unemployment, there is always some
unemployment in every society and for this reason, a small initial increase in unemployment
should not, at least theoretically, affect the incumbent party support by a comparable degree.
Instead, it could be expected that as the unemployment level initially increases, the decrease
in party support is relatively slow. However, as the unemployment level increases over some
critical point, the electorate starts to view it as a real problem in the society and the party
support starts to decrease more rapidly. It is worth noting that all of these relationships hold
true for the incumbent party but not the non-incumbent. For the non-incumbent party, the
relationships are expected to be exactly the opposite with low or negative gross domestic
product, high inflation or deflation, and high unemployment being positively correlated with
high support, as at these points, the non-incumbent becomes a viable alternative in the eyes
of the electorate.
The past research on forecasting party support using economic indicators has viewed the
linear regression with inflation and unemployment variables linearized as the "theoretically
correct" or a mechanism-based model. The reason for viewing linear regression as the
correct model, in this case, is that if the predictor variables are linear, the linear regression
model is also expected to yield the best results. Similarly, viewing it as a mechanism-based
model makes assumptions of how the economic indicators should theoretically influence
the economic voting function as we have the theoretical understanding of the underlying
associations. However, this thesis contests the notion that linear regression models are the
correct way to forecast party support using economic variables, as there are aspects that the
default linear model does not take into account, such as variable importance, time-series
characteristics, and non-linear associations, all of which might considerably improve the
prediction accuracy. This view places a premium on the forecast accuracy which could
possibly come at the expense of the model interpretability. As social sciences rely heavily
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on explaining the causality between variables, the black-box models might not be the ideal
option to understand different phenomena, but at the same time, if a theoretically uninformed
model produces consistently better forecasts than a theoretically informed one, it raises a
question if the theory under the latter model actually holds. To analyze this argument, the
thesis will explore three alternative approaches to forecast party support, each of which
addresses different shortcomings of the linear regression model: regularized linear models,
autoregressive integrated moving average models, and the decision-tree models.
The regularized linear models are viewed as a viable alternative as these models are able to
model data more flexibly and avoid over-fitting through variable selection. What variable
selection does is that it estimates the importance of each indicator in the model and places
greater importance on the ones that are more relevant to the model. Similarly, it shrinks
the coefficients of the redundant variables, which do not contribute to the accuracy or might
even decrease it, towards (or to exactly) zero. For this reason, in comparison with a default
regression model, the regularized linear model allows for better prediction accuracy by being
more flexible and in addition, less complex model due to variable selection. Another model
which the thesis argues to have improvements over linear regression is the autoregressive
integrated moving average model with external economic variables. The justification for
considering this model is that since the party support and economic data is in the time-series
format, the peculiarities of time-series must be also taken into account when forecasting.
Lastly, the thesis also benchmarks the decision-tree methods against the linear regression
model. For linear regression or any other parametric model, there is usually some underlying
mechanism in the data, such as relationships between different variables, which allow to
obtain the results. However, a disadvantage of the parametric approach is that the resulting
model will almost never match the true unknown form of the function, leading to poor
estimations. This problem can be potentially alleviated by choosing a non-parametric model
such as the decision-trees which do not make any explicit assumptions about the functional
form of the functions, but rather have the objective of seeking an estimate of the functions
that gets as close to all data points as possible without over-fitting. Such approach can
have a major advantage over linear regression or other similar models when the objective
is to maximize the prediction accuracy since it is not bounded by the same limitations as
the parametric models. For this reason, it is also necessary to analyze the data from the
methodological perspective that the parametric methods are unable to do by their design.
In order to outline the distinctions that set all of the aforementioned models apart from
17
each other, the thesis will also give an overview of the each of their individual theoretical
backgrounds. This is necessary, as having a full understanding of the mechanisms of each
model allows to understand how their individual differences affect the results they produce.
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2.3 Theoretical Background of Machine Learning Algorithms
2.3.1 Linear Regression
The simplest and most straight-forward approach to supervised machine learning is the linear
regression. Even though it may seem overly simplistic compared to some of the more modern
approaches such as decision-trees, kernel methods, and neural networks, it can still be used
to draw useful inferences off data. Additionally, linear regression can be seen as a starting
point for more complicated methods, as many other models can be viewed as generalizations
or extensions of it.
The main idea behind simple (single explanatory variable) linear regression is that it predicts
a quantitative outcome Y on the basis of a variable X. As the name of the method suggests,
linear regression assumes that there is approximately a linear relationship between X and Y
(James et al. 2017: 61). Mathematically, this linear relationship between these two variables
can be written as
Y = β0 + β1X + 
and read as "regressing Y on X". Coefficients or parameters β0 and β1 are unknown constants
that represent respectively intercept - that is, the expected value of Y when X = 0, and slope
- the average increase in Y associated with a one-unit increase in X.  is a mean-zero random
error term used as a catch-all for what the model misses as the true relationship is generally
not linear or there might be a measurement error. Using training data of X and Y, the
estimates of the coefficients can be produced and furthermore used to predict unknown Y
values, assuming that X values are known.
When it comes to finding the estimations of the β0 and β1, the goal is to find an intercept
and slope values such that the resulting line is as "close" (meaning minimized distance) to all
data points as possible; also known as the least squares method. In order to find this line, X
and Y should be first viewed as n (denoting training set sample size) observation pairs
(x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xn, yn)
where each pair consists of a measurement of X and the Y value with the corresponding index.
Plotting each of these pairs on a two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system, a straight line
with intercept β0 and slope β1 can be drawn through them. However, generally the data is
scattered and not in a straight line, so the drawn line cannot directly go through all of the
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data points. As a second-best alternative, it is possible to find a line with some intercept and
slope which minimizes the distance between data points and the said line. Mathematically,
the prediction for ith value of Y is based on ith value of X and can be written as yˆi = βˆ0+ βˆ1xi
(circumflex indicating predicted values). Using yˆi value, it is possible to find the difference
ei (or residual) between the ith observed response value and the ith response value that is
predicted by the linear model or using notation, ei = yi− yˆi. The minimum distance between
all of the data points and the line passing them can thus be calculated by finding the residuals
for all indexes, squaring the results (since the distance can be either positive or negative) and
summing the squares together (ibid.: 62). This is also known as the residual sum of squares
(RSS) and is defined as
RSS = e21 + e
2
2 + ...+ e
2
n =
n∑
i=1
(yi − βˆ0 − βˆ1xi)2
Using RSS in the context of the least squares method means that the algorithm iterates over
different combinations of βˆ0 and βˆ1 and chooses the pair which yields the smallest RSS value.
However, in reality, brute-force approximation is not needed as the theory (ibid.) shows that
the least squares coefficient estimates which minimize distance can be defined as
βˆ1 =
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2
βˆ0 = y¯ − βˆ1x¯
where x¯ = 1
n
∑n
i=1 xi and y¯ =
1
n
∑n
i=1 yi, or more simply, arithmetic means of the sample.
Simple linear regression approach generally works well when predicting a response on a
single predictor variable. However, in practice variance in a variable is explained by more
than one predictor. In these cases, fitting separate simple linear regression models would
not be a feasible solution as each of the models would ignore the other predictor variables
while in reality, there would exist a correlation between them which, in turn, influences the
coefficient values. To alleviate this problem, instead of fitting a separate model for each
predictor variable would be to extend the simple linear regression model Y = β0 + β1X + 
so that it can accommodate multiple predictors. This can be accomplished by adding other
predictor variables to the model and giving each of them a separate slope coefficient. Suppose
that the model includes p distinct predictors, mathematically, the multiple linear regression
model takes the form
Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + ...+ βpXp +  = β0 +
p∑
i=1
βiXi + 
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where Xj represents the jth predictor and βj quantifies the association between that variable
and the response. The each coefficient in the equation can thus be interpreted as the "average
effect on Y of a one unit increase in Xj , holding all other predictors fixed" (ibid.: 72).
Similar to β0 and β1 in the simple linear regression model, the regression coefficients β0, β1,
... , βp in a multiple linear regression model are unknown and must be estimated. Extending
yˆi = βˆ0 + βˆ1xi for the multiple predictor setting, the equation becomes
yˆ = βˆ0 + βˆ1x1 + βˆ2x2 + ...+ βˆpxp
and the least squares approach noted before is used to estimate the coefficient values. This
means the algorithm chooses β0, β1, ... , βp to minimize the sum of squared residuals which
can be written as
RSS =
n∑
i=1
(yi − yˆi)2 =
n∑
i=1
(yi − βˆ0 − βˆ1xi1 − βˆ2xi2 − ...− βˆpxip)2.
where the values of βˆ0, βˆ1, ... , βˆp that minimize the equation are the multiple least squares
regression coefficient estimates (ibid.: 73).
2.3.2 Regularized Linear Methods
As mentioned, more often than not, real-world data does not follow a linear trend. At first
glance, this aspect might make it seem like linear models are at a clear disadvantage in
relation to non-linear approaches which fit a non-parametric function to data, but empirically,
they are actually quite competitive. However, the least squares approach is not the only linear
model and for this reason, alternative fitting procedures which extend and improve upon the
linear framework should also be explored.
One of the ways to modify linear models is through regularization. Regularization, also
known as shrinking, essentially fits the model involving all p predictor variables, but the
estimated coefficients are shrunken towards zero (or estimated to be exactly zero) relative to
the least squares estimates. Two main reasons to consider for doing so are that the alternative
fitting procedures can yield better (1) prediction accuracy, (2) model interpretability (ibid.:
203).
For prediction accuracy, if the true relationship between the response and the predictions is
approximately linear, the least squares estimates will have a low bias. Additionally, if n p,
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where n is the number of observations and p the number of predictor variables the least
squares models also tend to have low variance and will generally perform well on test data
(ibid.). However, problems arise when n is not much larger than p as it leads to high variance
in the fit which can result in over-fitting and thus poor predictions on future data. To alleviate
the problem of increased variance as the difference between n and p decreases, regularization
(or shrinking) of estimated coefficients can be used. Using this method allows for substantial
reduction in variance at the cost of a negligible increase in bias, leading to improvements in
model accuracy and therefore better performance on test data (ibid.: 204).
In terms of model interpretability, it is often the case that some of the independent variables
used in a multiple linear regression model are weakly or not at all related to the response,
leading to unnecessary complexity in the model (ibid.). Using regularization, it is possible
to shrink (or remove) irrelevant variables in the model, leading to a model that could yield a
better prediction accuracy or be more easily interpretable. The least squares approach by itself
is extremely unlikely to yield and coefficient estimates that are exactly zero, so employing
regularization (or alternatively variable selection) is required.
The two best-known methods for regularizing the regression coefficients towards zero are
ridge regression and lasso (ibid.: 215, 219). The former is very similar to least squares, except
that the coefficients are estimated by minimizing different quantity. To show the comparison,
the least squares fitting procedure minimizes
RSS =
n∑
i=1
(yi − β0 −
p∑
j=1
βjxij)
2.
Ridge regression, on the other hand, could be written as
n∑
i=1
(yi − β0 −
p∑
j=1
βjxij)
2 + λ
p∑
j=1
β2j = RSS + λ
p∑
j=1
β2j ,
where λ ≥ 0 is a tuning parameter that must be determined separately (ibid.: 215). The
similarity between the two models is that both seek coefficient values that fit the data well
by minimizing RSS. However, the difference lies in the aspect that the ridge model includes
the second term λ
∑
j β
2
j , called a shrinkage penalty (ibid.). The shrinkage penalty is small
when β1, ..., βp are close to zero, so it has the effect of shrinking the estimates of βj towards
zero. The tuning parameter λ controls the relative impact of these two terms on the regression
coefficient estimates (ibid.). This means that when λ = 0, the penalty term has no effect and
ridge regression will produce the same estimates as the least squares method. On the contrary,
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as λ → ∞, the impact of shrinkage penalty grows, and the ridge regression estimates will
approach zero (ibid.). Another difference between the two approaches is that while the least
squares method produces only a single set of coefficient estimates, ridge regression generates
a different set of coefficient estimates for each value of λ. For this reason, selecting a good
λ value is critical from the model prediction accuracy point of view as different λ values
produce different results. The exact process of estimating the optimal λ value for ridge
regression will be further elaborated on later in the thesis.
Even though in many cases ridge regression can be viewed as an improvement over the least
squares method, it still has one general disadvantage - including all p predictors in the final
model. The shrinkage penalty λ
∑
j β
2
j shrinks all the coefficients towards zero, but does
not set any of them exactly to zero (except when λ = ∞) (ibid.: 219). While this may
not be a problem of prediction accuracy, it can make a model more complex and difficult to
interpret. The lasso (least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) could be regarded as
one alternative to ridge regression and is able to overcome the disadvantage of including all
predictors. Similar to the least squares and ridge regression, lasso coefficients minimize the
quantity (ibid.)
n∑
i=1
(yi − β0 −
p∑
j=1
βjxij)
2 + λ
p∑
j=1
|βj| = RSS + λ
p∑
j=1
|βj|.
Comparing lasso with the ridge regression formulation, it can be seen that the only difference
is that that β2j term in the ridge regression penalty has been replaced by |βj| in the lasso
penalty. In a statistical sense, the lasso uses an `1 penalty instead of an `2 penalty and "the `1
norm of a coefficient vector β is given by ‖β‖1 =
∑|βj|" (ibid.). As is the case with ridge
regression, the lasso model also shrinks the coefficient estimates towards zero. However, the
difference is that the `1 penalty has the effect of forcing some of the coefficient estimates to be
exactly zero when the tuning parameter λ is sufficiently large so in addition to regularization
it also performs variable selection (ibid.). As the result, the models generated by the lasso
approach could theoretically be regarded to have greater prediction accuracy than the least
squares method due to λ parameter and additionally, better interpretability than the models
generated by ridge regression because of variable selection. Similar to ridge regression, the
correct estimation of λ in a lasso model is of utmost importance and the process will be
explored in-depth later on.
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2.3.3 Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average Method
An autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model offers an alternative approach
to time-series forecasting problems by seeking to describe the autocorrelations in the data. It
is a generalization of an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model and is commonly
used in the cases where data is non-stationary or in other words, where the time series
properties depend on the time at which the series is observed (Hyndman & Athanasopoulos
2018). The ARIMA model could be specified as three different parameters: AR(p), I(d), and
MA(q) or (p, d, q).
The autoregressive component of ARIMA is referring to the notion that in an autoregressive
model, the dependent variable is regressed on its own lagged values or could be viewed
as a regression of the variable against itself. While in the multiple regression setting the
predictions are made using a linear combination of predictor variables, the autoregressive
model uses a linear combination of the past values of the variable to make predictions.
Based on this, an autoregressive model of order p can be written analogous to multiple linear
regression as
yt = c+ φ1yt−1 + φ2yt−2 + ...+ φpyt− + t
where c is the intercept, φ values are coefficients, y the variable, and t error term or white
noise.
The "integrated" I part of the model represents the degree of differencing the series. For
time-series analysis the data should be stationary, but it is not always the case and differencing
is the most commonly used approach to transform non-stationary series into a stationary
one. What differencing does is that it subtracts the observation in the current period from
the previous. Commonly, differencing is used to reduce trend and seasonality by removing
the changes in the level of a time-series (ibid.). As it is the change between consecutive
observations in the series, it could be written as
y′t = yt − yt−1.
Lastly, the moving average, or MA(q) component of ARIMA, represents using a linear
combination of past forecast errors in a regression-like model as compared to AR(p) model
which uses past values of the forecast variable. It means that the moving average models
relate to what happens in period t to only past random errors that occurred in the previous
periods. The MA(q) model can, therefore, be written as
yt = c+ t + θ1t−1 + θ2t−2 + ...+ +θqt−q
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where t is white noise. In the MA(q) model, each value of yt can be viewed as a weighted
moving average of the past few forecast errors (ibid.).
Combining autoregressive and differencing with moving average model yields a non-seasonal
ARIMA(p, d, q) model where the parameter values are non-negative integers. In this model,
p is the number of time lags of the autoregressive model, d is the degree of differencing or
the number of times the data have had its past values subtracted, and q is the order of moving
average model. The full model can thus be written as
y′t = c+ φ1y
′
t−1 + ...+ φpy
′
t−p + θ1t−1 + ...+ θpt−q + t
where y′t is the series differenced t times and the "predictors" on the right hand side include
both lagged values of yt and lagged errors (ibid.).
The disadvantage of this model is that while it allows the inclusion of the past values of
the dependent variable, it does not allow the other variables that might be relevant. On the
contrary, the linear regression models can include these variables but do not allow the ARIMA
time-series dynamics. However, by combining these two models it is possible to extend
the ARIMA model to allow other independent variables to be included in it. The equation
below shows the form of the equation which includes both ARIMA parameters and the linear
regression model
yt = β0 + β1x1,t + ...+ βkxk,t + ηt,
η′t = c+ φ1η
′
t−1 + ...+ φpη
′
t−p + θ1t−1 + ...+ θpt−q + t.
2.3.4 Tree-Based Methods
Another approach to regression analysis is using tree-based methods. These models involve
stratifying the predictor space into a smaller number of sub-spaces and then predicting using
the mean of the training observations in the region to which it belongs. The process of
splitting the predictor space can be graphically visualized in a tree-like fashion, hence the
name ’decision trees’. Default decision-tree models by themselves are generally simple and
useful for interpretation, but in terms of prediction accuracy, they cannot generally compete
with the best supervised learning approaches. To alleviate this disadvantage, the second
half of this sub-chapter will look at the approaches such as random forests and gradient
boosted trees, both of which involve producing multiple trees which are then combined to
yield a single consensus prediction. The reason for employing these methods is that while the
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resulting models are somewhat more difficult to interpret, there are generally also significant
improvements in prediction accuracy (James et al.: 303).
Pictured below in figure 2 is a graphical representation of the general form of a regression
tree
Figure 2. Graphical representation of a decision-tree model.
Xj < tk 
Zj < uk
R1
R2 R3
Where first at the top of the tree, the model splits the variable Xj based on the splitting rules
with the left-hand side being a sub-region where Xj < tk. Similarly, the right-hand side
consists of the sub-region of the data for which Xj ≥ tk. However, this sub-region is further
divided into two different regions based on the value of variable Zj compared to uk. The
predictions for each path are made at the bottom of the tree at respective end nodesR1, R2, R3
by calculating their mean values of Y . In other words, it could be said that the decision tree
stratifies the data into three regions of prediction space and these regions can in turn be written
as R1 = {X|Xj < tk}, R2 = {X|Xj ≥ tk, Zj < uk}, and R3 = {X|Xj ≥ tk, Zj ≥ uk}.
The process of creating a decision tree model could be viewed as two steps. First, the
model divides the predictor space into J distinct and non-overlapping regions R1, R2, ..., Rj .
Second, for every observation that falls into the region Rj , the model makes the prediction
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which is the mean of the response values for training observations in Rj (James et al. 2017:
306). The first step of the model divides the predictor space into high-dimensional rectangles
with the objective of finding rectangles R1, ..., Rj that minimize the RSS, given by
J∑
j=1
∑
i∈Rj
(yi − yˆRj)2
where yˆRJ is the mean response for the training observations within the jth rectangle (ibid.).
It would be infeasible, and for larger data sets computationally impossible to consider every
possible partition of feature space into J sub-spaces and for that reason, decision tree models
use a top-down, greedy approach known as recursive binary splitting. The approach is
considered top-down because it begins at the top of the tree, splitting each branch of predictor
space into two successive branches down on the tree and it is greedy because at each split,
it chooses the best split at that one point, rather than looking ahead and picking a split that
leads to a better tree in future steps (ibid.). To perform recursive binary splitting, the model
first selects the predictor Xj and the cutpoint s such that splitting the predictor space into
regions {X|Xj < s} and {X|Xj ≥ s} leads to the greatest possible reduction in RSS (ibid.:
307). More formally, the process can be viewed as that for any j and s, a pair of half-planes
R1(j, s) = {X|Xj < s} and R2(j, s) = {X|Xj ≥ s} can be defined and the model seeks the
values of j and s that minimize the equation∑
i:xi∈R1(j,s)
(yi − yˆR1)2 +
∑
i:xi∈R2(j,s)
(yi − yˆR2)2
where yˆR1 is the mean response for the training observations in R1(j, s) and yˆR2 is the mean
response for the training observations inR2(j, s) (ibid.). After the model has found the values
of j and s it repeats the same process of finding the best predictor and the best cut-point to
split the data so as to minimize RSS, but this time it does not pick the whole feature space
rather than one of the sub-spaces that resulted from the first split. The algorithm continues to
split sub-spaces into two until some stopping criterion, such as a minimum number of samples
in a sub-space, is reached. After that condition is met, the model has created sub-spaces
R1, ..., RJ and predicts the response for a given test observation using the mean of training
observations in the region to which that test observation belongs to (ibid.).
One of the disadvantages of the decision trees is that the model suffers from high variance.
For example, if the training data set was split into two at random and a decision tree was fit on
both halves, the results could be quite different. One of the ways to reduce the variance in a
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decision tree (or statistical learning methods in general) is to use bootstrap aggregation. The
idea of the method is that by taking repeated samples from a single training data set, building
a separate prediction model using each sample, and averaging the results, the variance of the
model can be reduced and prediction accuracy increased. In other words, it would be possible
to calculate f 1(x), f 2(x), ..., fB(x) using B separate samples drawn from the training data
set, and obtain a single, low-variance statistical learning model by averaging the results,
shown as follows (ibid.: 316-317)
fˆ(x) =
1
B
B∑
b=1
fˆ b(x).
Another alternative to the different types of tree-based methods is the random forests model.
The algorithm itself is relatively similar to bootstrap aggregation, but with the difference that
it decorrelates the trees from one another (ibid.: 319). This means that just like for bootstrap
aggregation, random forests model builds a number of decision trees using bootstrapped
training samples. However, when building the trees, each time a split is considered, a random
sample of m predictors is chosen as split candidates from the full set of p predictors and
the split is allowed to use only one of those m predictors (ibid.). It is also worth noting
that for each subsequent split, the model does not use the m sample already selected but
rather takes a new sample of m at each split. Also, the algorithm generally chooses the m
value so that the number of predictors considered at each split is approximately equal to the
square root of the total number of predictors or m ≈ √p (ibid.). The rationale for selecting
a sample of predictors at each split and not even considering a majority is that it alleviates a
potential problem of having one very strong predictor in the data over-influencing the results.
For example, having a very strong predictor and using the bootstrap aggregation on the data
would yield a set of trees which all, or at least most of them, would have this strong predictor
in the top split. This would result in a set of trees which all look very similar to each other and
thus the results from these trees would be highly correlated and averaging highly correlated
quantities does not lead to as large of a reduction in variance as averaging many uncorrelated
quantities (ibid.: 320). On the contrary, the random forest model would not consider the
strong predictor for on average (p−m)/p of the splits and so the other predictors would have
more of a chance. Doing so decorrelates the trees and could be regarded as providing trees
that are less variable and hence more reliable (ibid.).
A third approach to improve upon the predictions resulting from a decision tree is called
"gradient boosting". The difference between gradient boosting and other tree-based methods
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is mainly that while, for example, bootstrap aggregation involves building each tree on a
bootstrap data independently of the other trees and then averaging the results to obtain a
single predictive model, but for gradient boosting the trees are grown sequentially. This
means that "each tree is grown using information from previously grown trees" (ibid.: 321).
Additionally, boosting does not use bootstrap sampling like other improvements upon the
default decision tree model, but rather each tree is fit on a modified version of the original data
set (ibid.). Similar to bootstrap aggregation and random forests, gradient boosting involves
combining a large number of decision trees fˆ 1, ..., fˆB into a single predictive model, but the
algorithm used to obtain the trees is different. The process of gradient boosting for regression
trees could be viewed as three separate steps. Firstly, the model sets fˆ(x) = 0 and ri = yi
for all i in the training data set. The second step is that for b = 1, 2, ..., B, the model fits a
tree fˆ b with d splits to the training data (X, r), updates fˆ by adding in a shrunken version of
the new tree fˆ(x)← fˆ(x) + λfˆ b(x), and then updates the residuals ri ← ri− λfˆ b(xi) (ibid.:
323). Lastly, the algorithm outputs the boosted model
fˆ(x) =
B∑
b=1
λfˆ b(x).
More broadly, it could be said that instead of fitting a single large decision tree to the data
and therefore potentially overfitting, the gradient boosting algorithm "learns slowly" (ibid.:
321). By this, it is meant that the algorithm fits the tree using the current residuals, rather than
the outcome Y as the response and then adds this new decision tree into the fitted function
in order to update the residuals. It is also worth noting that each of these trees can be rather
small with just a few terminal nodes, the number of which is determined by the parameter d.
The advantage of fitting small trees to residuals is that doing so allows to improve fˆ in areas
where it does not perform well (ibid.: 322). Additionally, the shrinkage parameter λ slows the
process down even further and allows more and different shaped trees to attack the residuals
(ibid.). Overall, it could be said that the statistical learning approaches that learn slowly tend
to perform well. Mainly because they address the problems occurring in the models which fit
the data hard.
As it can be seen from the algorithm, the boosting approach has three tuning parameters: the
number of threes B, the shrinkage parameter or learning rate λ, and the number of splits in
each tree d. All of these parameters must be tuned optimally in order for a boosted model to
be as accurate as possible. The process of estimating these tuning parameters will be explored
more in-depth later on in the work, as the values are not constant but rather depend on the
particular data at hand.
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3 Research Design
3.1 Sources of Data
In order to conduct the empirical analysis, the work uses two different data sources. For
the party support, the data published by Kantar Emor is used. Kantar Emor is an Estonian
research agency, which specializes in many different expertises such as market intelligence,
customer strategies, behavioral economics, and among them, surveys support for Estonian
political parties among the electorate on a monthly basis in aggregate time-series format.
With regards to the sample size, the monthly surveys conducted by the agency generally
include around 1000 respondents and are representative of the voting-eligible part of the
population.
The three macroeconomic indicators used in the analysis, inflation, gross domestic product
growth, and unemployment are all from the data published by Statistics Estonia. Statistics
Estonia is the Estonian government agency responsible for providing both institutions and
individuals with reliable and objective data on a number of areas, such as economic, social,
demographic, and environmental. Even though the economic indicators are not all from the
same dataset, rather than from different sub-datasets under the economic indicators category,
the agency is in compliance with "international classifications and methods and in accordance
with the principles of impartiality, reliability, relevancy, profitability, confidentiality, and
transparency" (Statistics Estonia 2018). For this reason, even though the indicators are from
different datasets of the same agency, they are compatible to be used in an analysis together.
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3.2 Exploratory Data Analysis
3.2.1 Party Support
In order to understand party support better, it is important to evaluate why how large of
a degree does it fluctuate from one observation to another. The figure 3 below shows the
support for both parties over the observable period with the vertical black lines showing the
start/end of an electoral cycle.
Figure 3. Support of the Reform Party (red) and the Center Party (blue) from 2007 to 2015
with the black lines indicating elections.
Firstly, it is possible to infer from the plot that the support ratings between consecutive periods
are not very volatile. There does seem to be some inertia in the party support and the indicator
generally either moves in a clear upward or downward trend or stays approximately at the
same level over short-term with the changes becoming more pronounced over mid to long
periods. For this reason, the models used in the analysis also incorporate a lagged party
support value of t− 1 since it can be expected that using an observation from a month before
to predict the next one can yield accurate forecasts. Secondly, there seem to be clear cyclical
trends in the support that correspond to the theory of electoral cycle. As the Reform Party
has been in the coalition for the whole duration of the data, in accordance with the theory, the
support for the incumbent party is at its highest at the start and end of a cycle and lowest in
the middle. On the contrary, for the opposition party, the support is highest at the mid-point
in the electoral cycle and it can be clearly seen to be the case for the Center Party with their
rating being higher than for the Reform Party during these certain periods in the cycle.
31
3.2.2 Gross Domestic Product
One of the economic variables used in the analysis is the gross domestic product which
measures the change in the market value of all the goods and services produced in Estonia on
a quarterly basis. The time-series plot for the variable is pictured below in figure 4.
Figure 4. Change in gross domestic product from 2007 to 2014.
It can be seen from the figure that for the gross domestic product variable, there is not the
same amount of data available as for the party support. The reason for it is that from 2007
to 2014, the variable used 2005 as the reference period, based on which the change was
calculated. However, from 2014 to present, the Statistics Estonia results have used 2010 as
the reference period, making the latter data incompatible with the earlier results. For this
reason, the models used in the analysis will use the first 91 observations in the dataset to
fit the models. As was explained in the chapter on economic voting theory, the relationship
between party support and the change in the gross domestic product can be expected to be
linear. It means that if the change in the gross domestic product increases, the incumbent
party support is also expected to be higher and vice versa.
3.2.3 Inflation
Second of the economic indicators used in the analysis is inflation which measures the change
in the price of goods and services on a monthly basis. The data for inflation is depicted below
in figure 5.
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Figure 5. Change in inflation from 2007 to 2016.
The figure includes the inflation variable both in its original form and as the squared version
of the same indicator. The reason for doing so is that as can be recalled from the economic
indicators theory, the theoretical relationship between party support and inflation is expected
to be parabola-shaped. However, as some of the models used in the analysis are linear, the
data must be transformed to better correspond to the ideal data shape that the linear model
works best on.
3.2.4 Unemployment
Last of the economic variables used in the analysis is unemployment which is measured on a
quarterly basis. Figure 6 shows the change in the value of the variable over time.
Figure 6. Change in unemployment level from 2007 to 2017.
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Similar to the inflation variable, the relationship between party support and unemployment is
not linear, but rather steeper at some levels than others. As this type of data is not ideal for
the linear model, the variable is linearized by logarithmic transformation.
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3.3 Assessing Model Accuracy
In order to assess and compare the accuracy of different machine learning algorithms, it is also
necessary to fit the models properly. Since the data is in the time-series format, meaning that
the order of observations in the model is important, the one-step-ahead prediction method
is used to fit the models and obtain the results. While many other fitting methods simply
divide the data into training and test sets or alternatively training, validation, and test sets,
one-step-ahead divides the dataset into three different parts: training set, test set, and the data
which the model does not use. Essentially, one-step-ahead prediction could be viewed as
yˆt+1 = f(x1:t, y1:t) where each prediction is made by fitting the model with all of the data
points that precede it. Visually, the process of the prediction method could be viewed as
shown in the figure 7 below.
Figure 7. Visualization of one-step ahead prediction.
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To compare the results of different models that have been obtained using the one-step-ahead
method, the thesis uses the variance explained indicator, also known as the R2 score to
compare the observed test values to the respective predicted values. The way this indicator
works is that if yˆ is the predicted dependent variable output, y the observed output, and σ2 the
squared standard deviation or variance of the given data set then the explained is estimated as
R2 =
σ2{y − yˆ}
σ2{y}
where the best possible score is 1.0 and lower values are worse. In this equation, σ2 indicates
the expectation of how much does the dependent variable deviates from its mean.
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3.4 Optimizing Tuning Parameters of the Models
3.4.1 Ridge Regression
As noted before, in order to implement ridge regression and the lasso correctly, it is important
to select at least near-optimal value for the tuning parameter λ in their respective equations.
In reality, it is often a challenging task as the parameter is difficult to calibrate. Generally,
the most common approach to choose the λ value is to use cross-validation, but in the present
case, the method cannot be reliably used since the data is in the time-series format and
cross-validation might misinterpret the trend. The next most reasonable approach is to fix
the λ values as powers of 10 and compare the model performance for the different λ values.
There is no clear agreed-upon consensus on the range which to choose the λ value from, but
this work limits the range to the integer powers of 10 from 10−5 to 105. The reason for doing
so is that even if the values smaller than 10−5 or larger than the upper limit were to prove
better estimations, the improvement would be marginal and not worth the computation time.
Additionally, it is reasonable to use integers as the powers of 10, since it could be said that the
results for different integer powers do not generally fluctuate enough to warrant for iterating
over rational numbers in small steps. Below in the figure 8 are shown the ridge regression
results of macroeconomic indicators and party support for λ values from 10−5 to 105 for both
the Reform Party and the Center Party.
Figure 8. Ridge regression results with different λ values for both the Reform and the Center
Party.
It can be seen from the figure that for both parties the λ values 10−3 or smaller provide the
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best estimation since for these λ values, the models are able to explain variance the best. If the
explanation power lies constant like this over multiple different values, there is theoretically
no difference which parameter value to choose. For this reason, the ridge regression models
for both parties will use the λ value of 10−3 as the constant in their respective models.
3.4.2 Lasso Regression
As mentioned, the lasso model works similarly to the ridge model in a way that it also uses
the λ parameter that shrinks the coefficient estimates towards zero with the exception that it
can also set coefficients exactly to zero, or in other words, perform variable selection. Even
though the optimal ridge regression λ value cannot be used for lasso model, the process of
estimating the parameter is exactly the same. Below in the figure 9 are plotted lasso regression
estimations for λ values from 10−5 to 105 for both parties.
Figure 9. Lasso regression results with different λ values for both the Reform and the Center
Party.
The figure shows that for both parties, the lowest λ values provide the best estimation.
Even though the high values side of the model flattens out at around 10−4, both of the
models in the analysis will use λ = 10−5 as the parameter since it still seems to somewhat
improve over 10−4. However, it is not necessary to iterate over even smaller values as
the possible improvements in the model performance are very likely to be marginal as the
variance explained by both models at 10−5 is already very high.
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3.4.3 Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average Method
The autoregressive integrated moving average model consists of three parameters that must
be tuned: the autoregressive component p, the degree of differencing in the model d, and the
moving average q. The optimal combination of the different parameter values can be obtained
by looping through the different values of p and q for both d = 0 and d = 1. Even though
both the autoregression and moving average can take positive integer values limited by the
size of the dataset, for the present analysis, the values of these both parameters have the upper
limit of 3. The reason for doing so is that increasing the range would make the analysis more
complex with seldom providing a significant improvement over using the range from 1 to 3.
Below in tables 1 and 2 are displayed the ARIMA modelR2 estimations for the Reform Party
and the Center Party.
Table 1. Comparison of different ARIMA parameter combinations for the Reform Party.
d = 0 p = 1 p = 2 p = 3 d = 1 p = 1 p = 2 p = 3
q = 1 0.947 0.931 0.834 q = 1 0.963 0.954 0.936
q = 2 0.919 0.841 0.847 q = 2 0.954 0.946 0.907
q = 3 0.860 0.860 0.865 q = 3 0.918 0.915 0.897
Table 2. Comparison of different ARIMA parameter combinations for the Center Party.
d = 0 p = 1 p = 2 p = 3 d = 1 p = 1 p = 2 p = 3
q = 1 0.724 0.728 0.721 q = 1 0.755 0.756 0.756
q = 2 0.713 0.758 0.670 q = 2 0.708 0.756 0.731
q = 3 0.684 0.667 0.678 q = 3 0.752 0.713 0.739
It can be seen from the results, that for the Reform Party, the model that is able to explain the
variance best is p = 1, d = 1, and q = 1 which yields the value of 0.963. For this reason, this
is the parameter configuration that will be used for the Reform Party model that is compared
against the other machine learning algorithms. For the Center Party, there best estimation
is provided by the model p = 2, d = 0, q = 2 which gives the R2 = 0.758. However,
seeing as the broader goal is to provide more universally applicable models that could also
be potentially used to forecast the support of the other parties, the Center Party model will
use the same p = 1, d = 1, and q = 1 configuration as the Reform Party model. It can be
seen from the estimations that the difference between these two models for the Center Party
is rather marginal, so the loss of 0.2% variance explained is justifiable.
38
3.4.4 Random Forest
In order for the random forest and the gradient boosted trees models to provide the best
estimations, there are parameters that must be properly tuned beforehand for both models.
For the random forests model, there are two parameters that must be estimated: the number
of tried attributes and the number of trees. The importance of the former parameter is that it
chooses the number of possible predictors considered each split. Even though this parameter
allows for different options such as percentage or logarithm of all possible predictors, as the
theory already noted, the best estimation is generally provided by m ≈ √p where p is the
total number of possible predictors. As the current model has five independent variables, the
value of this parameter is m ≈ √5. It is not very important to try to optimize this parameter
rather than just choose the value that works generally the best as the random forest model is
usually not very sensitive about the value of this parameter. The number of trees parameter
in the random forest model must be estimated manually. There is no generally agreed upon
optimal number of the number of trees, but at the same time. it is not really possible to
overshoot with this parameter as the upper limit is essentially bounded by computational and
time constraints. For this reason, the correct way to estimate the optimal number of trees in a
random forest model is similar to the regularized linear models in a way that the estimation
can be obtained by looping the model for different values of the variable and then analyzing
how different values of the parameter compare to one another. The goal is to find the number
of trees where the model variance explanation power flattens out toward its upper limit, but
at the same time, is as low as possible to minimize the computational time. Below in figure
10 are pictured the estimations for both parties over different numbers of trees.
Figure 10. Random forest regression results with different numbers of trees.
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The results of both parties seem to stabilize when the model consists of around 20 trees.
However, it can be seen that at this point, the estimation for the Reform Party dips while the
Center Party peaks. For this reason, it would be more reasonable to pick a number of trees
parameter value where the estimations for both parties is comparably high. Looking at the
figure, it can be seen that one such point is while the number of trees in the model is 25 as at
that point the variance explained for the Reform Party is at its high and for the Center Party
near of its peak.
3.4.5 Gradient Boosted Trees
The gradient boosted trees regression model has three parameters that must be tuned for the
optimal model performance: the number of trees B, the shrinkage parameter or learning
rate λ, and the number of splits in each tree d. Similar to the random forest model, there
is no specific number of trees a gradient boosted trees model should include and more is
generally better as the model cannot over-fit. However, iterating over different values is not
feasible for the gradient boosted trees model as it would require tuning all three parameters
simultaneously to obtain the optimal combination. Instead, it is more reasonable to pick
"safe" parameter values that are bound to be more or less theoretically correct. For this reason,
in the present analysis, both models will use B = 1000 as using such value will surely be
enough. For the other two parameters, there does exist some previous literature on how to
properly tune them. For the λ value, the research states that the best strategy appears to be to
set the λ as low (λ < 0.1) as possible as larger shrinkage yields improvements in the model
performance (Hastie et al. 2016). Taking this into consideration, the models for both parties
will use the shrinkage rate of λ = 0.01 in their algorithms. It would be theoretically possible
to set the value even lower, but it is unlikely that the improvements would the significant
enough to justify doing so. Lastly, the number of splits in each tree can also be estimated
using gradient boosted trees theory. It states that generally, d = 2 will be insufficient and
at the same time, it is unlikely that d > 10 would be required (Hastie et al. 2016). For this
reason, it could be said that the values in the range of 4 ≤ d ≤ 8 would work relatively well
in the context of booting and as the results are relatively insensitive to the different values in
this range, it does not really matter which one to choose so the models will simply take the
middle value of the range and use d = 6.
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4 Results
The following chapter gives an overview of the results for all of the models for both the
Reform Party and the Center Party. It is worth noting that even though the metric used
to measure the model accuracy is the R2 score, the results are also visualized as scatter
plots where on the x-axis are the observed values of the party support and on the y-axis,
the predicted values. Additionally, the variance explained values presented in the results are
calculated using only the one-step-ahead prediction results from index t = 24 onwards. The
reason for doing so is that for the predictions, where the training data set is smaller, the model
might not fit the function well and the results can vary a lot from one observation to another.
However, after a while, as the number of observations in the training data grows, a better fit
can also be expected. It is likely that if the predictions, where the training sample size is very
low, were included, the R2 value would be significantly influenced by the outlier data points
and not so much representative of the actual value. The t = 24 value as the starting point is
completely arbitrary and assumes that around this point, the training data size becomes large
enough to start producing meaningful results.
4.1 Linear Regression
Figure 11. Linear regression results. Left: the Reform Party, right: the Center Party.
In the figure 11 are shown results of the simple multiple linear regression models for both
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the Reform Party and the Center Party. As it can be seen, the model for the Reform Party
has the R2 value of 0.90559 or in other words, the model is able to explain 90.559% of the
variance between the independent variables and the dependent variable of the party support.
However, for the Center Party, the linear regression model is able to forecast less accurately,
being able to explain only 60.096 of the variance (R2 = 0.60096), which is still a relatively
good result. Based on the associations outlined in the theoretical framework section of the
thesis, this model could be regarded as the theoretically correct. For this reason, the results
of all of the subsequent models which address the shortfalls of this linear regression will be
benchmarked against it.
4.2 Regularized Linear Methods
4.2.1 Ridge Regression
Figure 12. Ridge regression results. Left: the Reform Party, right: the Center Party.
It can be seen from the figure 12 that for the Reform party, the regularized ridge regression
shows the R2 score of 0.90556. This is basically the same result as the simple ordinary least
squares model produced, being able to explain 0.003% less variance. For the Center Party, the
result is very similar, giving the R2 = 0.60099, a 0.003% increase over the linear regression
model. From these results, it could be inferred that there is not much difference whether to
use a linear regression or the ridge regression as the results differ only marginally.
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4.2.2 Lasso Regression
Figure 13. Lasso regression results. Left: the Reform Party, right: the Center Party.
As can be seen from the figure 13, compared to the ridge regression, the lasso regression
model also produces relatively similar results. For the Reform Party, the model has the R2
value of 0.90437, a slight decrease over the ridge regression and the linear model. For the
Center Party, the model shows the R2 value of 0.60098 which is also similar to the previous
models. Based on these results, it is possible to say that the lasso regression does not seem to
offer any meaningful improvements over the ridge model and overall, variable selection does
not seem to play an important role.
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4.3 Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average
Figure 14. ARIMA regression results. Left: the Reform Party, right: the Center Party.
For the autoregressive integrated moving average model, it can be seen from the figure 14
that the results are better for both parties than the other algorithms are able to produce. The
R2 score of the Reform Party is 0.96317 which indicates that the model is able to explain
variance extremely well. For the Center Party, the same score is 0.75573 which is also a good
result taking into consideration the performance of the linear regression and the regularized
models, all of which provide around 15% worse results. More specifically, it seems like both
the differencing and the moving average aspect of it play part in the improved results. As
shown in the optimal ARIMA parameter choosing section, for both models, moving from
d = 0 to d = 1 with all of the other parameters the same yields around 1.6% increase for
the Reform Party and 3.1% increase for the Center Party. The rest of the improvement in the
models must be accounted to the moving average parameter q and not split between it and p
as the latter indicates the number of the dependent variable lags in the model and every other
model already includes a lag variable of t− 1. For this reason, it is possible to say that there
are time-series aspects for the forecasting of party support using economic voting that the
linear model by itself is not able to capture.
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4.4 Tree-Based Methods
4.4.1 Random Forest Regression
Figure 15. Random forest regression results. Left: the Reform Party, right: the Center Party.
Theoretically, the tree-based methods such as the random forest model strive for achieving the
best possible estimation by fitting a non-parametric function to the data and could, therefore,
be expected to provide the best forecasts. In the present case, as can be seen from the figure
15, the random forest model performs better than the linear regression and the regularized
models, but worse than ARIMA. Looking at the results more closely, it can be seen that for
the Reform Party, the R2 value is 0.90722 which is only a marginal increase over the linear
and regularized regression. For this reason, it could be said that in the Reform Party’s case
it is not necessary to fit a non-parametric function to the data as it does not offer much of an
improvement. For the Center Party, the R2 score is 0.66889. Similar to the Reform Party, it
is an improvement over the linear regression and regularized models, but at the same time,
performs worse than ARIMA. For this reason, it is likely that even though the model tries to
find the maximum estimation, it does not produce better results than ARIMA on its own.
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4.4.2 Gradient Boosted Trees Regression
Figure 16. Gradient boosted trees regression results. Left: the Reform Party, right: the
Center Party.
The last model used in the analysis was the gradient boosted trees regression. Similar to
the other tree-based methods, it is a non-parametric approach that tries to fit a function
that maximizes the prediction accuracy and for this reason, is expected to provide highly
accurate results. However, as it can be seen, in the present case, as the figure 16 shows,
the gradient boosted trees algorithm estimations are the worst out of all models. For the
Reform Party, R2 = 0.87870 which is around 2.7% worse than the baseline linear regression
model. Similarly, for the Center Party, the R2 value is 0.49680 which is also by far the worst
estimation by any model in the analysis. It is not entirely clear what exactly causes such
results in this model, but the most likely explanation is that the model simply is not able to fit
a good enough function to the model.
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5 Discussion
Even though the results were already separately outlined in the previous section, the following
table 3 also gives a concise overview of the prediction accuracy of the different algorithms
for both parties.
Table 3. Results of the different machine learning algorithms obtained in section 4 for both
parties.
Reform Party Center Party
Linear Regression 0.90559 0.60096
Ridge Regression 0.90556 0.60099
Lasso Regression 0.90437 0.60098
ARIMA 0.96317 0.75573
Random Forest 0.90722 0.66889
Gradient Boosted Trees 0.87870 0.49680
The linear regression model, which has previously been the default method when it comes to
forecasting party support using economic indicators was used as the benchmark to compare
the other models against, all of which could be argued to improve upon it in their own way.
However, as it can be seen from the results that most of the models do not provide better
estimations for forecasting party support. In terms of the regularized models, neither ridge or
lasso regression are able to increase or decrease the prediction accuracy by a very marginal
amount. For this reason, it could be said that for the data used in the analysis, variable
selection was not needed or was not able to produce better results. For the tree-based models,
the random forest regression was able to produce approximately the same results as the linear
regression for the Reform Party and somewhat better results for the Center Party. The gradient
boosted trees model, however, produced the worst results across the board. As the tree-based
models have the primary goal of fitting the data as close to the data points as possible without
actually over-fitting the data, such result was unexpected. It was expected that the tree-based
models would at least match the prediction accuracy of the baseline model or improve upon
it, seeing as these models are not bounded by the same restrictions as the parametric models.
It is difficult to evaluate and make an exact judgment on why did these models provide such
mediocre results compared to all of the others. It is a possibility that the models simply
weren’t able to find a function that would work both well on the training and testing data.
The only model that provided improvements upon the linear regression was the autoregressive
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integrated moving average algorithm. As can be seen from the results, the model was able
to explain variance much better than any other model in the analysis, improving the variance
explained for the Reform Party by around 5.76% and for the Center Party by around 15.47%.
These are pretty substantial gains and give an indication that there are time-series aspects
about modeling the party support through economic voting that the simple multiple linear
regression does not take into account. As already mentioned in the results, the improvements
come approximately equally from the inclusion of both differencing and moving average
parameters in the model, but not from the autoregressive parameter as it is already included in
the other models used. For this reason, the further research on the topic should also consider
incorporating these variables into the analysis as these results give a legitimate reason for
doing so.
Next, it is possible to see that the forecast accuracy for the Center Party is systematically
around 20 − 30% worse than all across the board than for the Reform Party. The exact
reasons for why is it so much more difficult to model the party support forecasts for the
Center Party than it is for the Reform are difficult to pinpoint. One reason might be that the
electorate of the Center Party is more stable and less responsive to the economic effects than
the electorate of the Reform Party. It is very much possible that the Reform Party electorate
is more in line with the economic voting theory while the Center Party voters are not. This
means that when the economic effects become favorable to the Center Party, the voters do
not move from the Reform Party to the Center Party, but instead, the other non-incumbent
alternatives and the Center Party voters are more reluctant to change their vote based on the
economic effects. Overall, it is a question that is difficult to address without a proper analysis
and could, therefore, be viewed as a further research topic on studying the party support in
Estonia.
Lastly, while the main research question of the thesis was to compare the linear regression
forecasting model to the models that address its shortcomings, its secondary goal was to
explore using more modern machine learning algorithms as the methods for social sciences
research. Even though most of the models, especially the tree-based methods, were unable to
improve upon linear regression in the present case, with the rise of big data, social sciences
researchers should be more motivated to consider these methods in their research, especially
when it comes to forecasting. There is already research published that uses machine learning
algorithms as methodology such as identifying behavioral patterns (King et al. 2013; Pierson
2017), measuring ideological and political preferences using big data (Bond & Messing 2015;
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Barbera 2014), applying machine learning algorithms in society to study human decisions
(Kleinberg et al. 2018). It can only be expected that as the time goes on, machine learning
models as legitimate social sciences research method will only become more prevalent so for
this reason, the researchers should already start looking in that direction.
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6 Conclusion
The main objective of the thesis was to compare machine learning regression algorithms
in the context of forecasting party support in Estonia using economic voting variables and
see whether more modern methodological approaches would produce improvements over the
linear regression model that has been used in the past. To analyze this research question, the
thesis compared the regularized linear methods of ridge and lasso regression, autoregressive
integrated moving average, and the decision-tree models of random forests and gradient
boosted trees, all of which have their separate merits over the linear regression and could
therefore potentially improve upon the default model. Even though there have been some
rudimentary studies at the Estonian level in the past, the analysis conducted in this thesis
was the first in-depth study that forecasts the party support using economic indicators as the
predictor variables.
The body of the thesis was divided into four main sections: theoretical background, research
design, results, and discussion. While the first of them gave a theoretical understanding of
both economic voting theory, the machine learning methods used, and how the economic
voting indicators are theoretically related to forecasting the party support, the other parts
were more empirical. Research design gave an overview of the sources of the data used in
the analysis and visualized the variables in the time-series format. Additionally, it focused
on optimizing parameters of the different algorithms as it is necessary to ensure the optimal
model prediction accuracy. The results chapter gave an overview of the results of all of
the models and benchmarked all of the models against the linear regression. Lastly, the
conclusion part of the thesis provided more general comments of the results of the analysis
and drew inferences of them.
The results of the analysis showed that while most of the models, such as the decision-trees,
were not able to estimate better than the linear regression model or in the case of regularized
models were able to do it very marginally, the autoregressive integrated moving average
model was able to produce very clear improvements for both parties used in the analysis.
For this reason, maybe aspects of the economic voting theory should be rethought to also
incorporate the time-series aspects that give the ARIMA model an edge over the linear
regression.
Even though the thesis was able to show that the ARIMA model could be regarded as a
better method to study this phenomenon, there still remain avenues for further research in
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economic voting in Estonia. One possibility would be the already mentioned question of
why is the prediction accuracy gap between different parties significantly large. Secondly,
the present thesis incorporated a small number of independent variables and for this reason,
it might also be worth looking into the variables that weren’t included in the present analysis
but which might influence the party support.
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